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ABSTRACT: In this chapter, I analyse the concept of emancipation in
terms of a philosophical anthropology of autonomy, which allows
me to assess the stakes of the historical development of the classical
form of the concept of emancipation and its connection to the idea
of minority, or Unmündigkeit. My thesis is that this conception reaf-
firms a hierarchical conception concerning the relationship between
knowledge and political action, leading to forms of tutelage based on
the necessity of education. In opposition to such a view, I draw on a
particular conception of materialism, which posits the reciprocal con-
stitution between activity (Tätigkeit) and subjectivity.
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In the Labyrinth of Emancipation
An Inquiry into the Relationship between Knowledge
and Politics
BERNARDO BIANCHI
Étrange parti pris cependant qui valorise aveuglément la profondeur
aux dépens de la superficie et qui veut que ‘superficiel’ signifie non
pas ‘de vaste dimension’, mais de ‘peu de profondeur’, tandis que
‘profond’ signifie au contraire ‘de grande profondeur’ et non pas ‘de
faible superficie’
Michel Tournier, Vendredi ou les limbes du Pacifique
INTRODUCTION
In theMarxist tradition, emancipation is often described as the oppos-
ite of either alienation1 or domination.2 However, during its politiciz-
* This chapter is based on three different strands ofmy research and aims to demonstrate
their interconnection. Firstly, it marks the closure of my research as a fellow at the Al-
exander von Humboldt Stiftung and the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher
Education Personnel of the Brazilian Government (CAPES). Secondly, it engages
with the research that has recently resulted in another co-edited volume published
by Routledge entitled Democracy and Brazil: Collapse and Regression. Thirdly, it aims
to bring together these two projects with the debates I have been engaged in with
Émilie Filion-Donato, Marlon Miguel, Ayşe Yuva, and many other dear friends from
the project ‘Materialism and Politics’.
1 See Gérard Bensussan, ‘Émancipation’, in Dictionnaire critique du marxisme, ed. by
Gérard Bensussan and Georges Labica (Paris: PUF, 1999), pp. 382–84.
2 See Ulrich Weiss, ‘Emanzipation’, ed. by Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Historisch-Kritisches
Wörterbuch des Marxismus, 15 vols (Hamburg: Argument, 1983–), iii (1997), pp.
272–89.
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ation in the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth
century in the Vormärz, it is not so much the alternative between both
dimensions, but rather their intertwinement, which becomes evident.
In this chapter, I analyse what I consider to be the classical form of the
concept of emancipation. This classical form is rooted in two funda-
mental features. On the one hand, it is based on a dichotomy between
passivity and activity, or heteronomy and autonomy. At the same time,
the concept is impregnated with the ideal of a process of maturation,
which takes the formof a process of intellectual development along the
lines of an organic growth.3
I analyse, on this basis, how the classical form of the concept
of emancipation developed according to a particular philosophical
anthropology of autonomy. This, in turn, gave rise to civil law as
the common reference for how to conceive political autonomy. My
purpose, as I develop in the section ‘Tutelage and the Labyrinth of
Emancipation’, is to demonstrate how this has been done and how this
conception has led, however well intended, to a hierarchical under-
standing of the relationship between knowledge and political action.
The latter trait is inseparable from what I define in a homonymous
section as ‘epistemocracy’.
According to the classical concept of emancipation, those who
lack judgment, since they are ‘incomplete’ individuals, are alieni juris,
and, consequently, cannot take part in the political life of their com-
munity — ‘before one can be a free citizen in the state, one must feel
free in the bosom of nature’.4 To emancipate oneself was the great task
of that time period as defined by Heinrich Heine,5 and it became a
requirement for the individual to engage in the political realm. Ac-
cordingly, emancipation forges an ideal of a fully-fledged individuality
in association with epistemic aptitude as the true basis for political
autonomy.
3 These two features have been partially identified by Ernesto Laclau in a provocative
text, which was originally published in 1992. In opposition to Laclau, however, I don’t
agree that these two dimensions lead to an undecidability between the ‘dichotomic
dimension’ and the ‘dimension of ground’. See his Emancipation(s) (London: Verso,
1996), p. 1.
4 Elme-Marie Caro, Problèmes de morale sociale (Paris: Hachette, 1887), p. 190.
5 Heinrich Heine, ‘Reise von München nach Genua’, inHeinrich-Heine-Säkularausgabe,
27 vols (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970–), vi: Reisebilder ii (1828–1831) (1986), pp. 7–72
(p. 61).
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TheLatin emancipatio, derived from the verb emancipare, from the
expression ex manus capere, indeed literally means ‘to take off hands’.6
In Roman law, this referred to the figure of the slave, but, primarily, to
the infantunder the rule of the pater familias—the infantbeing the one
who does not speak (in + fāns). In theGerman language, the fact of be-
ing unable to speak for oneself is at the basis of the nounUnmündigkeit
and the adjective unmündig, which can be literally translated as ‘non-
mouthed’.Unmündigkeit is also a legal concept that corresponds to the
English word ‘minority’, and goes hand in hand with the notion of
legal incapacity.7 In the thought of Immanuel Kant, minority became
associated with a problem concerning the attainment of autonomy, a
problem directly linked to that of emancipation.8 Accordingly, it can
be said that to emancipate oneself, to become autonomous, means to
have a voice, to be able to speak — both in one’s private affairs in the
form of legal capacity, as well as in the political realm in the form of
political rights.
In the section ‘Materialism and Emancipation’, I outline a very
intriguing formula employed by Étienne Balibar: materialism without
matter.9 Following Balibar’s usage of the expression and its connection
to Karl Marx’s ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, this conception of materialism
6 ReinhardtKoselleck andKarlMartinGrass, ‘Emanzipation’, inGeschichtlicheGrundbe-
griffe: Historisches Lexikon, ed. by Reinhardt Koselleck, Otto Brunner, and Werner
Conze, 7 vols (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1972–97), ii (1975), pp. 153–97.
7 I am referring to minority in reference to its meaning in terms of age. In English, as
in French and Spanish, the term minority (minorité in French andminoría in Spanish)
combines two differentmeanings: (i) the situation of a group that is smaller in number,
and (ii) the period before the attainment of majority. This is not the case in German
(nor in Italian and in Portuguese), which distinguishes between Minderheit, minority
in terms of number, andUnmündigkeit (orMinderjährigkeit), minority in terms of age.
8 See Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ [1784], in
Practical Philosophy, trans. by Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of
Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 15–22 (p. 17).
In the current chapter, I have chosen to translate Unmündigkeit in the work of Kant
as ‘minority’ and rejected other options such as ‘immaturity’, following the choice
made by Gregor in the Cambridge edition. I believe this choice is well justified for
two reasons. Firstly, it is the best option considering how Kant employs the concept
throughout his entire work, especially in the Doctrine of Right (first section of The
Metaphysics of Morals, which was also translated by Gregor in the Cambridge edition
of the works of Kant). Secondly, ‘minority’, differently from ‘immaturity’, is a legal
concept and, therefore, is more in line withUnmündigkeit.
9 ÉtienneBalibar,LaPhilosophie deMarx (Paris: LaDécouverte, 2014), p. 61. I also refer
the reader to Marianna Poyares’s contribution to this volume.
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posits the reciprocal constitution between activity (Tätigkeit) and sub-
jectivity, whichmeans that the emergence and development of human
beings are inseparable from their practice. On this basis, I argue in
favour of what I consider to be a materialist concept of emancipation,
a topic further developed in this volume by Marlon Miguel and Pascal
Sévérac. This conception is fundamentally distinct from the classical
concept in so far as it rejects, from the outset, the premises of the philo-
sophical anthropology of autonomy,which are based on the concept of
minority (Unmündigkeit) and lead to epistemocracy.Therefore, I argue
that a materialist concept of emancipation is rooted in the dismissal
of the concept of minority. This means, ultimately, the rejection of
hierarchical ways of articulating the relationship between epistemic
competence and political agency, which opens up different approaches
to education. However, instead of reversing the ‘principle of the ignor-
ance of the people’10 into the ‘principle of the wisdom of the people’,
the question seems rather to lie in conceiving a form of education akin
to the democratic principle of self-organization, leading to a process of
reciprocal constitution of knowledge and political agency.11
TUTELAGE AND THE LABYRINTH OF EMANCIPATION
On the eve of the French revolution, the Marquis de Condorcet, in
his Essay on the Constitution and Functions of the Provincial Assemblies,
distinguishedbetween thosewhoare entitled to the right of citizenship
(droit de cité) and those who are naturally excluded from it: ‘the exclu-
sion of minors, monks, servants, men convicted of crimes, all those
whomaybepresumednot tohave anenlightenedwill [volonté éclairée],
or a will of their own [volonté propre]; those who may legitimately be
suspected of a corrupt will’.12 A year later, Emmanuel-Joseph de Sieyès
laid the foundation of a fundamental distinction in constitutional the-
10 SeeCatherineColliot-Thélène, ‘L’Ignorance dupeuple’, inL’Ignorance du peuple: Essais
sur la démocratie, ed. by Gérard Duprat (Paris: PUF, 1998), pp. 17–40.
11 I argue, furthermore, that a materialist education should not be conceived as the activ-
ity of explaining human reality, as if this were composed of circumstances separated
from our own practice.
12 Marquis de Condorcet, Essai sur la constitution et les fonctions des assemblées provin-
ciales, inŒuvres deCondorcet, ed. byArthurCondorcetO’Connor andFrançois Arago,
12 vols (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 1847), viii, pp. 115–662 (p. 130; my translation).
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ory between active and passive citizenship which was enshrined in
the French law of 22 December 1789:13 ‘all can enjoy the advantages
afforded by society; but only those who contribute to the public es-
tablishment are […] true, active citizens, the true members of this
association’.14
The principle of autonomy, which is connected to the idea of an
independent and enlightened will, was a central trope of political rhet-
oric in the late eighteenth century. In fact, autonomy is what enabled
Condorcet to differentiate betweennatural and political individuals—
a distinction that could have no place in the ancien régimewhich, being
an organic society of corporate bodies, assigned political power not to
the individuals themselves but to status, that is, to the belonging of an
individual or group of individuals to specific sectors of the society. In
this sense, the ‘minors’ did not constitute a group like other groups
who were excluded from political life. After all, they were not a de-
terminate social category such as monks, servants, etc. In Condorcet,
as in thewritings of Sieyès, autonomy is the only thing that can legitim-
ize legally binding obligations in either the political or private sphere.
Therefore, legal capacity and political autonomy go hand in hand.15
In the same way, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, autonomy is
forged along the lines of the legal capacity:
13 This distinction was enshrined in the third article, section i, of the above-mentioned
law.
14 Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, Reconnoissance et exposition raisonnée des droits de l’homme
et du citoyen (Paris: Chez Baudouin, 1789), p. 21; my translation.
15 For this reason, Pierre Rosanvallon states that the foundations of themodern tradition
of civil law and those of political theory overlap (Le Sacre du citoyen. Histoire du
suffrage universel en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), p. 100). In fact, in French civil
law, the usage of the word ‘emancipation’ was widely connected to the legal capacity
(capacité juridique). At the end of the seventeenth century, Antoine Furetière defined
emancipation in his dictionary and encyclopaedia as the freedom ‘to act in one’s affairs
and to govern one’s income without the assistance of a tutor’ (‘Émancipation’, in
Dictionnaire Universel, 3 vols (The Hague and Rotterdam: Arnoud et Reinier Leers,
1701), ii, pp. 33–34 (pp. 33; my translation). In the Napoleonic Civil Code of 1804, it
is stipulated that emancipation can be both tacit, as in the case of marriage (art. 476 et
seq.), or explicit, when aminor is prematurely released from parental authority. These
conceptions reverberate in Antoine-Gaspard Boucher d’Argis’s spirit when he writes,
in 1755, the article ‘emancipation’ for the Encyclopédie of Denis Diderot and Jean le
Rond d’Alembert: emancipation is ‘an act that places certain persons outside the power
of another’ (‘Émancipation’, in Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des Sciences, des
arts et des métiers, ed. by Jean Le Rond d’Alembert and Denis Diderot, 17 vols (Paris,
1755), v, pp. 546–49 (p. 546; my translation).
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Theonly qualification for being a citizen is being fit to vote. But
being fit to vote presupposes the independence of someone
who, as one of the people, wants to be not just a part of the
commonwealth but also a member of it, that is, a part of the
commonwealth acting fromhis own choice in communitywith
others. This quality of being independent, however, requires
a distinction between active and passive citizens, though the
concept of a passive citizen seems to contradict the concept
of a citizen as such. — The following examples can serve to
remove this difficulty: an apprentice in the service of a mer-
chant or artisan; a domestic servant (as distinguished from a
civil servant); a minor (naturaliter vel civiliter); all women and,
in general, anyone whose preservation in existence (his being
fed and protected) depends not on his management of his own
business but on arrangements made by another (except the
state).All these people lack civil personality and their existence
is, as it were, only inherence.16
By drawing on civil law, Kant takes ‘civil personality’ as the measure
of citizenship. Nevertheless, the reference to civil law as a repository
for reflecting on political theory is obviously not specific to Kant. In
ThomasHobbes, this reference appears, for example, inChapter xvi in
Leviathan, where he develops his theory of representation.17 Hobbes
was adamant that in the absence of purposive actions assignable to a
personal identity, only a tutor could give final consent for any trans-
action in which the minor had a part. That is, because ‘children, fools,
and madmen […] have no use of reason’, they lack authority, that is,
‘the right of doing any action’.18 Furthermore, because unrepresented
minors are not legal persons, their tutelage is nothingmore than a form
of ‘representation by fiction’.19 Tutelage was different to the authority
of the parents over their offspring (patria potestas) which arose solely
16 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals [1797], in Practical Philosophy, trans. by
Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 353–603 (p. 458).
17 For the indebtedness of Hobbes’s theory to civil law, see Mónica Brito Vieira, The
Elements of Representation in Hobbes: Aesthetics, Theatre, Law, and Theology in the
Construction of Hobbes’s Theory of the State (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009), p. 156.
18 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Eccle-
siastical and Civil, ed. byWilliamMolesworth, inTheEnglishWorks ofThomas Hobbes,
11 vols (London: Bohn, 1839), iii, pp. 150 and 148.
19 Ibid., p. 149. See also David Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 21.
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from natural right.20 Instead, it was understood as the corollary of a de
facto situation concerning the lack of individuality of theminor. It had
no normative anchorage: tutelage did not aim at creating individuals
or producing autonomy.21
John Locke radically changed this position, as he connected the
authority of the parents to the duty of educating their offspring. The
power of parents over their children derived from their educative duty,
that is, their obligation to ‘inform the mind, and govern the actions
of their yet ignorant nonage […]’.22 Therefore, even though children
were to look upon their parents as ‘absolute governors’,23 their parents
were not to behave only as sovereigns but also as educators. This
meant that parental authority was not only conceived of in terms of
sovereignty, as in Hobbes, but also in connection to education.
We find this precise idea in Kant as well, not exactly in the text
of 1797, but in An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment
[Aufklärung]?’, whichwas published in 1784, where the idea ofminor-
ity as preparation for autonomy is clearly posited.
Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-
incurred minority. Minority is inability tomake use of one’s own
understanding without direction from another. This minority
is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding
but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction
from another. Sapere aude!24
Here, a second form of minority emerges, which is different from the
kind of minority that is mentioned in The Metaphysics of Morals. In
this text, Kant connects minority to the Enlightenment as its opposite
and, at the same time, its final objective, its raison d’être. Kant states
that this condition of being alieni juris occurs even in the condition
20 In Hobbes, tutelage is the form of patria potestas which is specific to civil society.
21 In this respect, tutors are analogous to sovereign.
22 John Locke,The Second Treatise of Government, in Locke: Two Treatises of Government
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 265–428 (p. 306). It’s worth
recalling that the term ‘nonage’ was also used to translate Kant’s Unmündigkeit into
English, as it was done by Mary Campbell Smith <http://www.columbia.edu/acis/
ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html> [accessed 30 June 2020].
23 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, in The Educational Writings of John
Locke, ed. by JohnWilliamAdamson (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 2011),
pp. 21–180 (p. 33).
24 Kant, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, p. 17.
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of natural majority or maturity.25 At the same time, he is obviously
not simply dealing with a minority resulting from the law (civiliter), as
he refers to in The Metaphysics of Morals, which is related to all those
who, despite having reached the age of maturity, remainminors before
the law, as was the case for all those still under tutelage. According to
Kant, the minority in this case is not a mere product of nature, but
rather fundamentally a problem concerning the habit of dependence,
of letting others decide — a form of voluntary tutelage. Moreover,
Kant’s text from1784 introduces the idea ofminority as preparation for
autonomy and not simply its opposite. In contrast to his other writings,
Kant’s What is Enlightenment is more in line with the old problem
of voluntary servitude,26 which implicitly points in the direction of
Étienne de la Boétie.
The connection between Kant’s thought and La Boétie’sDiscourse
on Voluntary Servitude, originally published in 1574, was definitively
consolidated by Johann Benjamin Erhard who, in 1793, translated it
into German and had it published in Der neue teutsche Merkur, which
was an important journal of dissemination for the Aufklärung at that
time. Unlike the Monarchomachs,27 La Boétie’s text sheds light on
how subjects voluntarily adhere to a despotic government — not
simply out of fear or sheer violence—so that they become accustomed
to tyranny. For Erhard, the minority cannot simply be described in
terms of a relation of domination by force or by law, since self-incurred
minority (which is anexpressionheborrowed fromKant) corresponds
to a ‘degree of formation of the spirit’.28 In Erhard’s eyes, Kant offered
25 On this specific occasion, one could write ‘natural maturity’, because in this case Kant
is referring to ripeness, or the biological condition of maturation.
26 Even though this formulation does not entirely match what could be described as
minority in light of Kant’sCritique of Judgement, since, in the latter text, Enlightenment
is identified as the ‘liberation from superstition’ (Befreiung vom Aberglauben), both
texts suggest an idea of minority as preparation for autonomy.
27 It is worth recalling, in this regard, the work Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, originally
published in 1579, and possiblywritten byPhilippe deMornay, considered to be one of
themost celebratedMonarchomach treatises of that time period.This book formulated,
for the first time, a theory of the sovereignty of the people as the origin of the king’s
power (Hubert Languet,VindiciaeContra tyrannos, or, Concerning the Legitimate Power
of a Prince over the People, and of the People over a Prince (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
28 Johann Benjamin Erhard, Über das Recht des Volks zu einer Revolution (Berlin: Syn-
dikat, 1970), p. 82; my translation.
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an answer to the problem of voluntary servitude posited by La Boétie,
in which he proposed that through the propagation of the lights, that
is, the diffusion of knowledge, it becomes conceivable to foresee an
exit from the state of minority. However, if kept against their will in a
state of minority, the people have the right to revolution: ‘as long as
the ruling class does not prevent the people from the Enlightenment
and as long as it maintains its primacy based on the predominance of
its own Enlightenment, there will be no revolution of the people’.29
It is onlywhenminority becomes a dogma for the people that they
have the right to abolish the state that oppresses them. As a result,
revolution becomes an act of resistance and not an act of creation. In
Erhard’s view, it is the dogma of minority in terms of the repression of
human progress that causes revolutions, and although he does not use
the term emancipation (like Kant), he clearly addresses the concept
by tapping into the development of a self-incurred minority towards
a majority, or from voluntary servitude to becoming a people who
know their rights. Nevertheless, this progress takes the form of a pro-
cess of intellectual development along the lines of an organic growth.
However, as Hans Blumenberg has shown, the limits of the metaphor
of organic growth do not only concern the unjustifiable belief in ‘a
continuous progress of rationality’,30 but instead the fact that the hour
of ‘political majority’ only tolls after a process of intellectual develop-
ment. By considering Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Erhard together, one
can argue that the attainment of ‘the use of reason’ coalesces with the
‘propagation of the lights’, and gives way, paradoxically, to the idea of
benevolent forms of tutelage justified by the de facto minority of the
people. Under such a worldview the transition from minority towards
‘complete knowledge of human rights’ becomes ultimately impossible,
and tutelage becomes a labyrinth from which emancipation can never
emerge.
29 Erhard,Über das Recht, p. 95; my translation.
30 Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1999), p.
440.
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EPISTEMOCRACY
In the period of time known as the Vormärz, or ‘pre-March’, preceding
the 1848Revolutions in the states of theGerman confederation,Heine
took up the argument concerning the connection between emancipa-
tion and minority. He wrote that a true transformation must assume
the form of a transformation of mentalities, which also justified, in
his view, the superiority of German philosophy vis-à-vis the French
political transformations of the time. While the transformative energy
in Francewas, in his opinion, directed against feudal privileges, inGer-
many it was directed instead towards abolishing intellectual obstacles
and privileges.31 By drawing a comparison betweenKant andMaximi-
lienRobespierre,Heineunderscored the importanceof the intellectual
transformations that had taken place in Germany, thus highlighting
how they were more radical and more mature than the French revolu-
tionary efforts.32 In Germany, the most important revolutionary task
was not seen as being directly political but rather ‘spiritual’ (geistig) or,
to put it in contemporary terms, as a matter of consciousness. Heine
explicitly praises the Germans, in contrast to the French, whom he
characterizes as infantilized, shallow, immature, and prone to unpre-
meditated action.
A similar argument is to be found in a text by Ludwig Feuerbach
from 1842 in which he identifies sensualism and materialism with
revolution (and France), while metaphysics and idealism are associ-
ated with reformism (and Germany):33 ‘The heart — the feminine
principle, the sense of the sensible, the seat ofmaterialism—isFrench-
minded; the head — the masculine principle, the seat of idealism —
is German. The heart makes revolutions; the head, reforms. The head
brings things to a state; the heart, tomotion’.34 When placed in connec-
tion with Heine’s thoughts, Feuerbach’s analysis reveals an argument
according to which the French mentality (and its materialism) entails
a sort of transformation that is inferior to German philosophy (and its
31 See Heinrich Heine, Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland, in
Heinrich-Heine-Säkularausgabe, inHeinrich-Heine-Säkularausgabe, viii:Über Deutsch-
land, 1833–1836. Aufsätze über Kunst und Philosophie, pp. 125–230 (p. 191).
32 Ibid., pp. 194–95.
33 Ludwig Feuerbach, ‘Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie’, in Gesam-
melte Werke, 14 vols (Berlin: Akademie, 1970), ix, pp. 243–63 (pp. 254–55).
34 Ibid., p. 255; my translation.
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idealism) because the latter philosophical culture is not limited to the
surface of things. This perspective offers a view that displaces politics
by postulating the existence of a field of determination from which
politics emerges as a product, or secondary reality, of a core that is
located beyond it. This shows how Heine and Feuerbach prepared the
argument—which was later much associated withMarx— according
to which French materialism (and the politics that stem from it) is
ideological.35
These arguments implying the separation between depth and sur-
face, or essential and secondary phenomena, are inseparable from
stadialist arguments based on the hierarchization of the relationship
between intellectual development and political emancipation.36 Stadi-
alist arguments are also quite common in the discussions surrounding
the emancipation of subaltern groups, such as Jews, Blacks, women,
the working class, etc.37 Between 1842 and 1843, Bruno Bauer wrote
two interventions on the emancipation of theGerman Jews:The Jewish
Question and The Capacity of Present-day Jews and Christians to Become
Free.38 In these texts, which were starkly criticized by Marx, Bauer
argued that in order to achieve political emancipation Jews needed to
be freed fromtheir prior prejudices.39 According toBauer, theyneeded
to overcome their state of minority in order to become citizens. Here,
again, we can identify the philosophical idea, very prevalent in Ger-
many at the time, that a reformof consciousnessmust precede political
emancipation.
35 In this sense, one could rightfully identify Heine’s and Feuerbach’s writings with
Jacques Rancière’s category of meta-politics. See Jacques Rancière, Disagreement:
Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), pp. 81–
82.
36 I refer the reader to the definition of ‘stadialism’ in the Introduction (p. 11, n. 17).
Anti-stadialism here should not be misunderstood as rejection of the idea of stages. It
refers instead to the idea of a linear and hierarchical evolution that entails a separation,
in the form of a progression, between the moment of formation, on the one hand, and
that of political autonomy and activity, on the other.
37 In this case, we could say that the meaning of minority in terms of age (Unmündigkeit)
encounters its meaning in terms of number (Minderheit).
38 See Bruno Bauer, Die Judenfrage, first published in 1842 by the Deutsche Jahrbücher
für Wissenschaft und Kunst and Die Fähigkeit der heutigen Juden und Christen, frei zu
werden, first published in 1843 by the Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz.
39 The core of Bauer’s argument can be found in the opening pages of ‘The Jewish
Question’, in The Young Hegelians, an Anthology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983), pp. 187–97 (pp. 187–88).
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In 1850, Hermann Scheidler was confronted by the same ques-
tion and contrasted two fundamental forms of emancipation: inner
emancipation (innere) and outer emancipation (äußere). While the
first chiefly concerned superstition and the passions, the second con-
cerned political autonomy.40 Based on this idea, Scheidler defended
the importance of a public pedagogical project (Volks- and Staatspäd-
agogik) in order to bridge the two forms of emancipation — we are
once again faced with the problem of education, which, as we have
seen, justified parental authority in Locke’s work. This argument leads
us to the paradoxical, yet deeply ingrained, relation between domin-
ation and education. This concerns not only the fact that education
was often employed as a means to dominate, but also the idea that
domination prepares for self-rule (educates) those who were deemed
still unfit for it. For example, in the context of slavery in the Americas
the subjugation and domination of Blacks and Native Americans was
often justified ‘as a way to prepare them for eventual participation in
society as full citizens’.41
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Even though Sieyès’s invention of the distinction between passive and
active citizenshipwasmainly connected to pecuniary hindrances upon
the right to vote, entailing a system of censitary suffrage, it was also in-
serted, as we have seen, into a broader discussion about autonomy and
minority. After the revolution of 1848, the Second French Republic
abolished the last economic obstacles to exercising the right to vote,
and instituted universal adult male suffrage, a trend that later spread
throughout the continent. In the same time period, however, another
form of exclusionwas consolidated: exclusion through illiteracy.How-
ever, in Europe, exclusions based on illiteracy have never had the same
importance as they had in the Americas.42 In the United States the
propagationof literacy tests, whichwere administered to voters, spread
40 Hermann Scheidler, ‘Judenemancipation’, in Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wis-
senschaften und Künste, ed. by Johann Samuel Ersch and Johann Gottfried Gruber, 167
vols (Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Gleditsch, 1850), xxvii, pp. 253–315 (p. 266).
41 YukoMiki,Frontiers of Citizenship:ABlack and IndigenousHistory of Postcolonial Brazil
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 55.
42 See Jairo Nicolau,História do Voto no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2002).
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in the mid-nineteenth century and lasted until the second half of the
twentieth century. In Brazil, the exclusion of the illiterate became a
constitutional norm with the first republican constitution of 1891,
which eliminated the censitary suffrage created by the imperial consti-
tution of 1824.43 As these examples show, in the context of profoundly
racialized societies, knowledge became a way of cloaking unequal ac-
cess to citizenship.
In view of these forms of political exclusion, I want to coin a term,
epistemocracy,44 which refers to all forms of discourse according to
which political action is dependent on the possession of knowledge
and competence by an individual or a group of individuals. Epistemo-
cracy allows for a modern form of tutelage, according to which those
individuals and groups of individuals that find themselves in a state
of minority (Unmündigkeit) should be completely governed as long as
their minority persists. In this paradigm even though the minors are
to be regarded as citizens, they are also denied a say in political life
so long as they are deemed minors. Therefore, epistemocracy allows
for forms of tutelage on the ground of ‘epistemic incompetence’. It
separates active (mündige) citizens from passive (unmündige) citizens,
or those whose voice should be heard from those whose voice should
be ignored. The legitimacy of epistemocracy is different from open
domination in that it is built upon the potential reversibility of the
situation affecting those deprived of their political rights based on the
proviso that, so long as they become epistemically competent, they
can leave their minority status and take part in political life. Regarding
this view, it must be said that minority is not something per se, it is
not a natural state resulting from ignorance and backwardness, and
nor does it arise from nature. Quite to the contrary: it is the result of
ideological constructions bymeans of which the individuals in a given
43 For a discussion about the introduction of the ‘literacy census’ in Brazil, see Sérgio
Buarque de Holanda, História Geral da Civilização Brasileira, 11 vols (São Paulo:
Bertrand Brasil, 2005), vii, p. 234. The exclusion of illiterate people from their right
to vote lasted until 1985 in Brazil, the final year of the military dictatorship.
44 My usage of the concept of epistemocracy must be distinguished fromDavid Estlund’s
concept of ‘epistocracy’. See his Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). In opposition to epistocracy, epis-
temocracy is not limited to the rule of experts, as it does not just concern political rule
or governance, but, more importantly, political agency and political participation.
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society are endowed with different functions. Consequently, instead
of the concept of minority, one should prefer the idea of minorization,
which underscores the fact that minority is not something that exists
by itself, but the result of practices and choices entailing the political
distinction between those whose voice is heard and taken into account
and those who are deemed to be incomplete individuals — and who,
therefore, need to be under tutelage.45 In this sense, minorization is
inseparable from epistemocracy, which ultimately re-enacts different
forms of domination, especially those connected to class, gender, and
race, under the appearance of differences in competence and know-
ledge.
MATERIALISM AND EMANCIPATION
As I have outlined in the previous sections, the classical concept
of emancipation is inseparable from a political anthropology of
autonomy. One of the clearest arguments against epistemocracy
corresponds to ‘the insurrectional moment of citizenship’46 as it was
theorized by Jacques Rancière in his bookDisagreement. Furthermore,
the relationship of this conception of citizenship (or emancipation)
to the question of education was clearly articulated in Rancière’s The
Ignorant Schoolmaster. In this work, emancipation acquires special
contours insofar as it is associated with Jacques Jacotot’s revolutionary
pedagogy; an (anti-)pedagogy which, in the first decades of the
nineteenth century, rejected the hierarchy of intellectual capacity
and instead asserted that all people were equally competent.47 For
45 I am using the term of minorization in a sense that is not identical to Gilles Deleuze’s
and Félix Guattari’s ‘becoming-minor’— or the term ‘minoritization’ which is derived
from it. ‘Becoming-minor’ and ‘minoritization’ are built on the basis of the ‘minority’
as the smaller in number, a meaning that Deleuze extrapolates by saying that it cor-
responds to a ‘state of rule, that is to say, the situation of a group that, whatever its
size, is excluded from the majority, or even included, but as a subordinate fraction in
relation to the standard of measure that regulates the law and establishes the majority’
(Gilles Deleuze, ‘One Less Manifesto’, in Mimesis, Masochism, & Mime: The Politics
of Theatricality in Contemporary FrenchThought, ed. by Timothy Murray (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 239–58 (p. 255)).
46 Étienne Balibar, Equaliberty: Political Essays, trans. by James Ingram (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2013), p. 10.
47 This equality is explained by the following: ‘every common person might conceive
his human dignity, take the measure of his intellectual capacity, and decide how to
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this reason, Jacotot proposed that each person would be able to
become a master for the others and to support them in their own
intellectual development. Based on Jacotot’s perspective, Rancière
method ‘consists not merely in aiming for future equality, but in
directly producing its effects, precisely by positing it as an “axiom” in
the first place’.48 Without equality, the people would become stultified
by the superstition of their lack of intelligence.49
Through his complete rejection of minorization, Rancière’s axio-
matic presupposition of emancipation leads us to overlook the prob-
lem of education. The title of this section ‘materialism and emancipa-
tion’ points, however, in the direction of what could be regarded as
a contradiction; after all, emancipation and materialism are concepts
that stem from different traditions. This means that the operation of
reconciling both concepts will ultimately imply their transformation
into something else. I believe, however, that this reconciliation brings
about a form of emancipation that neutralizes epistemocracy, avoid-
ing, nevertheless, the form of an insurrectional moment it takes in
Rancière. It also brings about a form of materialist education which
is fundamentally anti-stadialist.
As Ayşe Yuva argues in her contribution to this volume, materi-
alism cannot be reduced to a debate regarding the primacy of matter
over spirit. FriedrichA. Lange, whowas notwilling to assign the origin
of materialism to a specific time period, stated in 1865 that this tradi-
tion was as old as philosophy itself and corresponded to the specific
struggle against religious thought, which is also why materialism has
so often been associated with impiety.50 However,Marx and Friedrich
Engels instituted a controversy by analysing the origin of the materi-
alist tradition in early modernity. Marx’s reception of materialism is
complex and even problematic, since his account of the modern his-
use it’ (Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 17).
48 Katia Genel, ‘Jacques Rancière and Axel Honneth: Two Critical Approaches to the
Political’, inRecognition orDisagreement: ACritical Encounter on the Politics of Freedom,
Equality and Identity, ed. by Katia Genel and Jean-Philippe Deranty (New York:
Columbia University Press), pp. 3–32 (p. 29).
49 Ibid, p. 39.
50 Friedrich Albert Lange, The History of Materialism and Criticism of its Present Import-
ance, 3 parts (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1925), i, p. 5.
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tory of materialism inTheHoly Familywas fundamentally copied from
Charles Renouvier’s 1842 Handbook of Modern Philosophy — not the
best source to study the theme.51 Nevertheless, Marx still achieved a
theoretical breakthrough by proposing a new materialism, at the earli-
est in his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ in 1845.52
According to Marx’s ninth and tenth theses ad Feuerbach, mater-
ialism is characterized by the reciprocal constitution between activity
(Tätigkeit) and subjectivity, which leads to the concept of practice.53
This reciprocal constitution takes the form of a ‘recursive loop […]
where the products and the effects are at the same time causes and
producers of what produces them’.54 Even though Marx had already
proposed the reciprocal constitution between activity and subjectivity
in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, in 1844, it was only with
the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, from 1845, that he could start to theorize
this recursive loop concretely in terms of social relations, and not ab-
stractly in terms of human essence.This shift represents a radical break
with previouswritings, such as hisContribution to theCritique ofHegel’s
Philosophy of Right.
In 1993, using an expression that he borrowed from Friedrich H.
Jacobi,55 Balibar proposed that this perspective be named ‘materialism
without matter’, claiming that ‘Marx’s materialism has nothing to do
with a reference to matter’.56 The concept of materialism without mat-
ter is inseparable from Balibar’s further research in terms of transindi-
viduality, which affirms the reciprocity between processes of individu-
51 Which has been meticulously demonstrated by Olivier Bloch, Matière à Histoires
(Paris: Vrin, 1997), pp. 384–441.
52 See the contribution by Frieder Otto Wolf and his discussion around the notion of
‘materialism of materialities’.
53 See Karl Marx, ‘Thesen über Feuerbach’, in MEW [Marx-Engels-Werke, see abbrevi-
ations], iii (1958), pp. 5–7 (p. 5). I follow Frank Fischbach’s preference for translating
the term with practice — avoiding, therefore, writing the word as Praxis/praxis. To
keep it in the German original represents an undue proliferation of concepts. See
Franck Fischbach, Philosophies de Marx (Paris: Vrin, 2015), p. 27.
54 See Edgar Morin, On Complexity (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2008), p. 49.
55 See Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, ‘Letter from Jacobi to Fichte’, inTheMain Philosophical
Writings and the Novel Allwill, ed. by George di Giovanni (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1994), pp. 497–536 (p. 502). However, Balibar’s usage of the expres-
sionmust be distinguished from Jacobi’s, since the latter has used it to describe Johann
G. Fichte’s Doctrine of Science as an inverted Spinozism.
56 Balibar, La Philosophie de Marx, p. 60; my translation. I also refer the reader to
Marianna Poyares’s contribution to this volume.
BERNARDO BIANCHI 179
ation (autonomization) and of individualization (singularization).57
In his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, Marx argues that oldmaterialism is ideal-
ist like idealism itself because it assumes reality as a given fact based
on the exteriority between subject and object — and not in the form
of what I call, based on Edgar Morin, a recursive loop. Because philo-
sophers have neglected the reciprocal constitution between activity
and subjectivity underlying human practice, they have historically pre-
ferred education, even the ‘edification of the masses’, to the detriment
of revolution58 —the interpretation of theworld, rather than its trans-
formation.59 Precisely for this reason, Marx says in the third thesis
on Feuerbach that ‘the educators must be educated themselves’60 —
a problem extensively analysed by Miguel in his contribution to this
volume.
I would like to propose a historical example that can address the
problems concerning the relationship between emancipation and edu-
cation that I have outlined in the previous two sections. After the
introduction of universal adultmale suffrage in France, notably in view
of the election of Napoleon III, a preoccupation with educating the
people in order to adjust them to political participation led to the
fashion known as démopédie.61 This concept, which was analysed by
Rosanvallon, involved the art of educating or instructing the people
(demos + paideia). It is an idea that weds together the right to vote and
instruction, as if true political agency can only be attained through a
previous process of edification of themasses, or, as discussed through-
out this text, the kind of epistemocracy that is similar to the examples
concerning the exclusion from the right to vote in Brazil and in the
United States.
Rather than postulating the axiomatic neutralization of epistemo-
cracy, as Rancière does, I believe a solution against stadialist and
57 See Étienne Balibar, Spinoza politique. Le Transindividuel (Paris: PUF, 2018), p. 306.
See also Jason Read,The Politics of Transindividuality (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
58 Balibar, La Philosophie de Marx, p. 61.
59 Marx, ‘Thesen über Feuerbach’, p. 7.
60 Ibid., pp. 5–6. This question reappears much later, in 1875, in Marx’s Critique of the
Gotha Programme.
61 The term is used following Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s sentence ‘democracy is démopé-
dia’, quoted by Pierre Rosanvallon, Le peuple introuvable: histoire de la représentation
démocratique en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1998), p. 127.
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hierarchical conceptions regarding the relationship between know-
ledge and political action is to be found in the idea of a materialist
education. A materialist education cannot be regarded as the trans-
mission of knowledge; instead it must be conceived as intrinsically
political. However, this does notmean that it is political in the sense of
political philosophy.On the contrary, as Balibar recalls: political philo-
sophy has always taught that themultitude is intrinsically violent, and,
therefore, that it is in needof education—whichmeans that it needs to
have knowledge transmitted to it, as if knowledge could be transmitted
from the outside. But autonomy is not the corollary of education. The
ideal of a fully-fledged individuality as the condition for autonomy
was, as we saw, the very basis of the philosophical anthropology of
autonomy, leading to the labyrinth of emancipation. As illustrated in
the case of démopédie, such a view leads to the vicious circle of elitism
and tutelage. In opposition to this perspective, materialism can play
a role in redefining the relationship between knowledge and political
action in an anti-stadialist fashion. Accordingly, education becomes
intrinsically political as long as it is regarded in the form of a recursive
loop between the process of learning and the process of acting and
transforming reality. Paraphrasing Marx, one could say: autonomy is
not the reward of education but is, instead, education itself.62
62 The original sentence is as follows: ‘Blessedness is not the reward of virtue but is virtue
itself ’ (Karl Marx, ‘Hefte zur epikureischen, stoischen und skeptischen Philosophie’,
in MEW, xl, pp. 13–258 (p. 155)). Marx quotes Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics v, 42; CWS
[The Collected Works of Spinoza, see abbreviations], i, p. 616.
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